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How Price Instability Complicates the 
Analysis of Price Supports 
Bruce Gardner 
Agricultural economists often invoke instabil-
ity, risk, and uncertainty as central concepts 
in understanding farm policy. Yet in analyzing 
policy alternatives we typically use compara-
tive static methods that shift supply and de-
mand curves and find new equilibria without 
reference to uncertainty in the economy or 
economic behavior other than profit-maxi-
mizing (risk neutral). This is true even in the 
most complex models being used to analyze 
1985 farm bill alternatives, such as Johnson, 
et al. (1985). The aim of this paper is to under-
stand this combination of simultaneous em-
phasis and neglect of risk considerations in 
policy analysis, and to assess costs of ignoring 
risk. The discussion consists of two parts, the 
first on normative considerations and the sec-
ond on positive economics and risk. 
The Goal of Stabilization 
At one level, the practical normative econom-
ics of stabilization consists of statements of 
politicians and agricultural experts about the 
goals of agricultural policy. Prominent among 
the goals, indeed chief among them in some 
lists, is the idea of ensuring consumers of the 
availability of food and of defending farmers 
against developments causing disastrously low 
returns. The goals can be summarized as a 
desire to provide stability of food prices and 
farm incomes. 
At a second level, even more practical nor-
mative economics is implicit in goals as re-
vealed by the consequences of enacted poli-
cies. The goals revealed in this way are better 
described as price and income support than as 
stabilization. The distinction is that stabiliza-
tion moderates the tails of the frequency dis-
tributions of prices and returns, reducing the 
frequency of both extremes, while support is 
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concerned only with raising low prices and 
returns. The revealed goal of U.S. agricultural 
policy is farm income support. Congress in the 
past 50 years has never to my knowledge 
enacted a piece of legislation intended to bring 
down unusually high farm returns. The closest 
approach in recent years was perhaps July 
1975, when bakers were testifying that bread 
prices would reach $1 per loaf if the Soviet 
Union were allowed to buy more of the U.S. 
wheat crop, at a time when food prices were 
rising at double-digit annual rates. Congress 
not only did not act but when President Ford 
did attempt downward stabilization through a 
hold on grain sales to the Soviets, the reaction 
of Congress was to pass legislation intended to 
prevent the Executive Branch from ever doing 
such a thing again. Presidents, in 1975, and 
also with the meat price freeze and soybean 
embargo of 1973, have attempted downward 
price stabilization on rare occasions, but it has 
been politically costly. President Carter halted 
grain sales to the Soviets in January 1980, not 
to bring prices down but to punish the Soviets 
in the matter of Afganistan. He made every 
attempt to ensure that farmers suffered no 
losses in consequence. But he still paid a sub-
stantial price politically. 
In short, stabilization as a policy goal is a 
mirage. We may think we see it, but it is not 
there. Still, policies do affect price and income 
instability, even if in an asymmetrical manner. 
The situation is further complicated in that 
changes in policy may themselves be a source 
of instability, as several agricultural econo-
mists have emphasized in recent years. 
The normative issue from an analytical 
viewpoint is the incorporation of instability 
and risk into welfare economics. In what sense 
can commodity price instability constitute a 
market failure, and how do we measure the 
social costs? My assessment of this subject 
appears elsewhere (1985) and will not be re-
stated here. Instead, let us turn to some issues 
in positive economics in the presence of com-
modity market instability. The discussion is at 114    October  1985 
an elementary level, but quicky leads to com-
plicated problems. 
Price Supports Under Instability 
For concreteness let us characterize instability 
as randomness in price received by producers 
caused by unpredicted variability in demand, 
e.g., export demand for grains, or in agricul-
tural output. The introduction of a price sup-
port program can be analyzed at the following 
levels: (1) effects on (the frequency distribu-
tion of) prices facing a farmer, (2) effects on a 
farmer's profits or returns, (3) effects on a 
farmer's utility, and (4) effects on market 
equilibrium. In the existing literature effects 
(1) are well known in general although prac 
tical   procedures   for   calculating   effects   of 
price supports are not well developed. Effects 
(2)  have been well developed. Effects (3) have 
been explored much less, but may nonetheless 
have been overplayed. Effects (4) have hardly 
been investigated but are the most important 
effects. 
1. The first step in analyzing price supports 
under uncertainty is to replace the concept of 
equilibrium or expected price by a frequency 
distribution of producer prices. Certainty is 
then a special case in which the frequency 
distribution degenerates to a spike at the mean 
price with zero frequency for all other prices. 
In this special case a support price has no 
effect if the support price level, Ps, is below 
the market equilibrium level, Pe. In the uncer-
tainty case, the support price truncates the 
frequency distribution at Ps, and so has an 
effect even if Ps < Pe. 
How can we quantify the effect? If we con-
sider the frequency distribution of price, we 
want to know, first, the difference between 
the mean of the underlying distribution, Pe, 
and the mean of the distribution when the tail 
with P < Ps is eliminated. This expected gain, 
E(AP), is 
(1)  E(AP) =   [" Pr(P) P dP -   T Pr(P) P dP. 
JPS  Jo 
We rule out negative prices and assume that 
Pr(P), the probability that price is at level P, 
for all P ^ Ps is the same whether the lower tail 
is truncated or not. This implies that the inte-
grals from Ps to infinity cancel out the ex-
pected price change is: 
(2)  E(AP) = PsPr(P8) -   [
PsPr(P) P dP 
Jo 
NJARE 
where Pr(Ps) =   f
Ps Pr(P) dp, i.e., the cumula- 
Jo 
live probability of prices below Ps in the ab-
sence of price supports. The additive terms in 
equation (2) can be collected to yield: 
(3)  E(AP) =   [
PsPr(P) (Ps - P) dP. 
Jo 
This is the value of an option to sell at Ps, i.e., 
a put option with strike price of Ps. This value 
can be readily approximated if we know the 
frequency distribution of prices below Ps. 
Even more simply, if we are willing to as-
sume that the commodity price is normally 
distributed, we have 







(Ps -   P)  dP 
The integral is taken from 0 since negative 
prices do not occur; but since a normal dis-
tribution of P can generate negative prices, the 
lognormal distribution is preferable. For prac-
tical purposes, however, the assumption of 
normality may not make much difference and 
it makes the algebra a little simpler. (The reader 
who wishes to see results for lognormal 
prices is referred to Gardner 1977.) 
Equation (4) can be simplified for calculat-
ing purposes by the trick of expanding (Ps — P) 
to (Ps - P - P H- P), dividing the integral into 
two parts and converting to a standard normal 
form by setting Z = (P — P)/o\ This implies 
that dP — o-dZ. The manipulations yield: 
(5)  E(AP) = (Ps - P)  [
Zs —L^ e~
z2/2 





Jo     
V2n 
= (Ps - P) F(Zg) + (o-/V277)e-
z2'
2 
where F is the cumulative normal density 
function and Zs  is the normalized support 
price, (P9 - P)/or. 
For example, suppose that for soybeans P = 
$6.00 per bushel, the standard deviation of 
price is $.80, and the support price is $5.60. 
This means that Zs = (5.60 - 6.00)7.80 = - .5. 
Since the cumulative normal probability to 
— .5 is .309, we have: 
E(P) = -.4 (.309) + (.8/2.507)e--
25/2 = 
$.16 
Thus, we can estimate the expected price gain Gardner 
from a support price below the mean price. 
Note that as a- -» 0, E( AP) -> Ps - P for Ps > P 
and zero for Ps ^ P. 
2. The effects on a farmer's expected 
profits are to a first approximation straight-
forward. Profits rise by the amount of the ex-
pected revenue gain. However, we need to 
consider a producer's supply response to an 
increased expected price. The increased costs 
associated with output expansion must be sub-
tracted from the expected revenue increase. 
The net increase is the increase in producers' 
surplus. 
Following Oi (1961), there have been many 
studies of the effects on profits of variability in 
price when the mean price is unchanged. The 
findings generally are that price variability 
makes producers better off, assuming that 
producers can respond to random price 
changes after they occur. For example, if ex-
port demand increases, and hence output price 
rises, producers can increase production to 
take advantage of the enhanced profit oppor-
tunities. In such models the stabilization ele-
ment of a support price makes producers 
worse off, so that a static analysis overstates 
their gains. 
If variability takes the form of uncertainty, 
in which producers must choose a desired 
production level before the random price is 
known, the effect of variability price on prof-
its is ambiguous. If a producer's output is un-
correlated with price, then a change in vari-
ability leaves expected revenue unchanged, 
and since costs are the same for all outcomes, 
expected profits are unchanged. If price and 
output are correlated, then expected profits 
may increase or decrease depending on the 
functional form of the demand function, the 
form of disturbances and the correlation coef-
ficient between the farm's output and market 
price (see Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, Chapter 
ID- 
3. The effects on a farmer's utility are the 
same as the effects on profits if utility is a 
linear function of profits, i.e., if the marginal 
utility of profits is constant. This condition is 
equivalent to the farmer's being risk neutral. If 
the farmer is risk averse, i.e., the marginal 
utility of profits declines as profits increase, 
the stabilization element of the price support 
program can make producers better off even if 
their expected profits were to decline. Helms 
(1985) illustrates this point with examples for 
consumers. The usual result for producer sup-
port prices would be that risk aversion implies 
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producer gains even greater than the expected 
profit gains would indicate. Moreover, if con-
sumers are highly risk averse and the com-
modity supported is large enough in consum-
ers' budget shares, it is possible that consum-
ers as well as producers can be made better off 
by a price support program. This is, however, 
unlikely to be an important point in practice, 
as suggested by the results of Helms' simula-
tion. The most extreme risk aversion he con-
siders is an Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion 
coefficient of 6, which implies that consumers 
would give up about 12 percent of their (mean) 
income in exchange for stabilizing an income 
stream that, unstabilized, would have a coef-
ficient of variation of .2 (i.e., expected devia-
tion from mean income is 20 percent of mean 
income). Helms finds that even in this case 
consumers are worse off when price is 
stabilized at 5 percent above its mean value. 
4. The preceding are at best partial results 
because they do not consider change in market 
equilibrium caused by price supports. Analyz-
ing the consequences of price supports in this 
context is a problem in comparative stochastic 
statics—stochastic because randomness is in-
corporated in the model, but static in that we 
look at stationary mean values rather than ad-
justment paths overtime. Some complications 
in such analysis are apparent in even the 
simplest models. Consider a 2-state model 
with linear supply and demand. Let the (in-
verse) demand function be: 
(6)  P = a0 - aj Q 
Let the supply function be 
(7)  Q = b0+ bjP* + v 
where P* is expected price and v takes on 
constant values rt v, each with probability .5. 
For a first approximation to market equilib-
rium, let us use the usual "rational expecta-
tions" specification. The approach defines 
equilibrium as equality of producers' antici-
pated price P* with the (statistical) expecta-
tion of price P (see Turnovsky). The equilib-
rium is found by taking expectations of (6) and 
(7) and solving: 
P = a0 - at [b0 + bj P] 
fQ\  f>   _    
aO ~~   3-ibo 
W  r — -—•------ —- 
1 + atbi 
which is the intersection of demand and mean 
supply. Now suppose we introduce a price 
support level Ps, at which the government 116    October  1985 
buys all that the market will not take at Ps. 
This means that the demand function becomes 
perfectly elastic at Ps. Now P will be Ps when 
v is positive and at the market clearing price 
when v is negative. The average of prices at 
the two outcomes is: 
P5 = 1/2 {a0 - a! [b0 + bi Ps - v]} + 1/2 Ps 
Solving for P, 
(9)    P = 1/2 [a0 - al(b0 - v) + PJ, 
PL < Ps < PH 
where PL is P when v > 0 and PH when v < 0. 
Ps < PL has no effect. For Ps > PH, Ps = Ps. 
Equation (9) enables us to calculate the mean 
price associated with any price support level. 
Consider the particular price support level 
where Ps equals the mean price with no inter-
vention, so that in a static framework the pro-
gram would have no effect. Substituting for 
this level of Ps from (8) into (9), 
HOI  P   =         
vai 
^
1U'  *•*  /">     i     n   U  -\  (2 + a^O 
In order to see what this amounts to, figure 1 
shows a special case in which a0 — 13, a! = .1, 
b0 — 70, bi = 10, and v = 10. This implies a 
mean supply-demand intersection at P — 3 and 
Q = 100. The price support at Ps = 3 implies 
Ps = 3.33 and Qs = 103.3, plotted as point R in 
figure 1. From equation (10) we see how the 
expected price differs from the support level, 
and how this difference_depends on v. In par-
ticular, defining AP = Ps — Ps, we have 
(11)  d(AP)  ai 
dv  2 + aibi 
which is positive for normal-sloped demand 
and supply. Thus point R rises along the mean 
supply curve as v increases. 
This first approximation does not generate 
full competitive equilibrium, however. Con-
sider the example. We have the following 
price-quantity pairs under the support pro-
gram: ifv- -10, thenP, Q is (3.67, 93.3), and 
if v - +10, (3.00, 113.3). This implies that 
re venue is 342.4 if v = - 10 and 339.9 if v = 10, 
for a mean of 341.15. If this is to be rep-
resented as competitive equilibrium at point 
R, then P • Q on the mean supply curve should 
have the same value. But 3.33 x 103.3 = 
344.0. Therefore R is not the equilibrium. In 
fact, P = 3 and Q = 100 is not the equilibrium 
with no program! With no program the P, Q 
pairs are (3.50, 95) if v = - 10 and (2.50, 105) if 
v = +10. Mean revenue is 1/2 • 332.5 + 1/2 
262.5 = 297.5, which is less than 3 • 100. An 
industry-wide expectation of loss is not con-
sistent with competitive equilibrium. 
The problem is the specification of the ra-
tional expectations equilibrium as P = P*. For 
(risk-neutral) models of Turnovsky and other 
work following Muth (1961), we need a zero-
profit condition for equilibrium. In expected 
value this is 
(12)  E(PQ) = E(P*Q), 
or expected revenue equals expected eco-
nomic cost. Expected economic cost is an op-
portunity cost concept, the receipts necessary 
to induce producers to provide the quantity of 
expected output that consumers will purchase. 
The implication of this equilibrium condition 
for the linear two-state model of equations (6) 
and (7) is that we cannot simply set P — P*. 
Instead, we have, where Q is expected output, 
(13)  E(R) = E(PQ) 
- l/2(a0 - ai(Q + v))(Q + v) + 
l/2(a0 - ai(Q - v))(Q - v) 
and 
(14)  E(P*Q) = -£-° Q + 4- Q
2- 
bi  D! 
Equation (14) is obtained by solving (7) for P*, 
expressing it in terms of intended output 
(omitting v), and multiplying by Q. Intended 
output is assumed equal to (statistically) ex-
pected output—a condition for equilibrium. 
This specification implies that producers can-
t dj t th i i t d d t t i tGardner 
is substituted into (6) and solved for P. The 
relevant distinction has been labelled as being 
between price variability and uncertainty. 
Variability refers to a situation such as pre-
planting wet weather which affects planting-
season price expectations and hence current-
year output. Uncertainty refers to a situation 
in which the farmer makes production deci-
sions and only afterwards does the random 
shock occur, e.g., an August drought in corn. 
Equations (6)~ (7) model variability, and 
(13)-(14) uncertainty. 
Equating (13)-(14), obtains the quadratic 
(15)    (-1 + El) Q
2  4- g_° + a0) Q + alV
2 = 0. 
For the parameter values above, (15) is 
.2Q-
2 - 20 Q + 10 = 0, Q = 
99.5. 
The resulting equilibrium is shown in figure 
2 most straightforwardly as the intersection of 
total cost and expected revenue at point E. 
From the upper panel, this is not the quantity 
at which the intersection of intended supply 
and demand. The appropriate depiction of 
competitive equilibrium in P, Q space is the 
intersection of the expected average revenue 
(EAR) function with the intended supply func-
tion. The EAR function specifies, for every 
intended quantity Q*, the expected revenue 
per bushel. This would be a point on the de-
mand curve only if the total revenue function 
were linear which would only be if the inverse 
demand function were of the form, P — a 4-
BQ-
1). 
Because EAR is less than the demand price 
at each quantity for a linear demand curve 
(quadratic total revenue function), competi-
tive equilibrium is characterized by less output 
than at the supply-demand equilibrium. This 
implies that mean price will be above the price 
at supply-demand intersection. In figure 2, the 
price under uncertainty is $3.05 per bushel and 
EAR is $2.95 at the competitive equilibrium Q 
of 99.5, while stationary supply equals de-
mand at P = 3.00 and Q = 100. 
For risk-averse consumers and/or produc-
ers the analysis of full equilibrium is more 
complex. We need to know how revenue 
translates to income, and then how income 
translates to utility. Following on the preced-
ing example, suppose that half of the costs of 
intended output are purchased inputs, the 
other half are returns to producer-owned in- 
 
puts. Suppose further that these returns con-
stitute half of producers' income, the other 
half being nonstochastic income from some 
other source. This means that in the 2-state 
example with equilibrium as shown in figure 2, 
we have: when v = -10, Q = 89.5, P = 
4.05, PQ = 362.48; and when v = 10, Q = 
109.5, P = 2.05, PQ = 224.48; which implies 
that mean net returns are 293.48/2 = 146.74. 
Under the assumptions, there is an equal 
amount of nonstochastic income, so total in-
come, y, is 293.48. Since all the variation in 
revenue is residual income to the farmers, 
when v = —10, y = 362.48 and when v = 10, 
y — 224.48. The coefficient of variation of y 
is .236. 
Continuing the example with utility in the 
two states, suppose all the farmers are identi-
cal and have equal shares of market income, 
and all have the same utility function, of the 
constant-risk-aversion form, 
(16)         U(Y) = C + (1 - RK'y
1-*, 
where C is a constant and R is the relative 
risk-aversion coefficient U"(Y)/U' (Y) Y. 
Let R = 1.5, so that U(Y) = C - 2/VY. This 118    October  1985 
degree of risk aversion implies that producers 
would exchange the example's income stream 
for a stable income stream that was 4 percent 
smaller. 
To find competitive equilibrium under risk 
aversion we equate the expected utility gain 
from the uncertain income from producing the 
crop to the (certain) utility loss from produc-
ing it. The utility loss is simply the utility of 
the cost as given by equation (14) which in our 
example is: 
U(P*Q) = C - 2\^ Q + £s Q
21~*. 
l_bi  bi      J 
Similarly, the expected utility gain is obtained 
from (13), and we find the market equilibrium 
by equating (13) and (14), as modified, solving 
for Q. 
(17)    C - 2&-° Q + J- Q*l~* = 4-<
C - 
2/K
a°  j_bi  DI      J  2 
4- ai(Q + e))(Q + e)]-*} 
+ -I{C - 2/[(a0 + a/Q - e)) 
x (Q- e)]-*} 
Note that C cancels out, so that R is the only 
parameter of the utility function that affects 
the solution for Q. Using the parameters of the 




2 + 1_1Q + 120)--
5 
+ (-.1Q
2 + 15Q -  140)--
5= 0 
which solves for Q = 98.9. This implies a 
mean price of $3.11. As shown in figure 2, risk 
aversion approximately doubles the output 
decline and price rise that occurred under risk 
neutrality, as compared to the supply-demand 
intersection (certainty case). 
In the way risk analysis is typically applied, 
the entire difference between certainty out-
comes and results under uncertainty is attrib-
uted to risk aversion. For example, one could 
draw a supply curve through the joint where 
P = 3.11 and Q = 98.9, as shown by the curve, 
S', in figure 2. The shift from the certainty case 
is then interpreted as an indicator of risk aver-
sion. But this sort of "shift" occurs even 
without risk aversion; in the example only 
about half the output reduction occurs be-
cause of risk aversion. It might be less open to 
misinterpretation to represent equilibrium un-
certainty by using the EAR function to show 
the (risk-neutral) revenue effect and a shift in 
NJARE 
S to represent the risk-aversion effect, as in 
the dotted curve S". This intersection of D' 
and S" then shows full equilibrium under un-
certainty . 
Conclusions 
What is the empirical significance of the four 
types of complications? Consider the corn 
program in the 1985 farm bill. Several in Con-
gress have proposed freezing the 1986 target 
price at the 1985 level of $3.03 per bushel. 
Others, including the Reagan Administration 
want to reduce the target price by making it a 
declining function of past prices, e.g., 100 per-
cent of the past 5-year average in 1986, 95 
percent in 1987, etc. The farm prices of corn 
for the past five years are: $3.11, $2.50, $2.68, 
$3.25, and $2.65 per bushel (the last figure 
being USDA's estimate for 1984/85). The 5-
year average is $2.83. The practical question for 
policy analysis is: what difference will it 
make in 1986 if the target price for corn is 
$3.03 or $2.84? 
Supposing that $2.84 is the appropriate 
mean price, we can calculate from equation 
(4) the increase in expected price caused by 
increasing the target price to $3.03 if we know 
the parameter a-  (assuming normality). The 
sample standard deviation of price for the past 
five years is $.16 per bushel. Using these val-
ues in equation (4), the expected producer 
price gain is $.20, as compared to the $.19 that 
a deterministic approach would assume. The 
accuracy of estimates of both P and cris ques-
tionable , but the difference between the 
stochastic and the crude deterministic esti-
mates is too small to cause excitement. (But of 
course for support prices below mean price, 
the stochastic estimate of price effect can be 
substantially greater than the zero effect that a 
deterministic model gives.) 
Bringing in expected profits or producers' 
surplus gains requires knowledge of the supply 
function, and cost components of farmer-
owned and purchased inputs. Our information 
here is weak, but this difficulty applies as 
much to policy analysis in a deterministic as in 
a stochastic framework. 
Bringing in risk aversion for farmers and 
consumers is important if: (a) they are sig-
nificantly risk averse, and (b) the commodity 
in question accounts for a significant fraction 
of farm income or consumers' budgets, and 
(c) market participants do not manage risk by Gardner 
non-program means, e.g., hedging, diversifica-
tion, insurance. We really do not know enough 
about any of these factors to assert that policy 
analysis that ignores risk aversion and just 
adds up monetary gains and losses is mis-
guided. 
Bringing in market equilibrium occupied 
most of the discussion in this paper. It be-
comes a factor in applied policy analysis only 
when we have already dealt with the preceding 
micro-level complications, and with additional 
serious problems, not discussed here, with ag-
gregating over diverse individuals. Given the 
difficulties of undertaking these preliminary 
steps, the full stochastic competitive equilib-
rium methods discussed are not in the cards 
for analyzing policy alternatives in the 1985 
farm bill. Nonetheless, it is good to be aware 
of what is being ignored when we ignore un-
certainty doing comparative statistics of the 
usual kind. The main practical lesson is that 
even "low
1' price supports can have substan-
tial effects. For policy research, the bottom 
line is the difficulty of separating out the con-
sequences of risk aversion from the (risk neu-
tral) effects of variability on expected profits, 
a subject on which the authors of estimates of 
farmers
1 risk aversion coefficients or supply 
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shifts due to risk aversion have been unduly 
optimistic about their capabilities. 
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